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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Of course, if the contractor buys, there is no necessity of his putting
up cash (except sheriff's costs and fees), for he simply bids in his lien.
However, unless he is willing to tender to the vendor the balance of the
contract price himself, he must find someone willing to pay that bal-
ance due on the lands, or he has a rather hollow legal victory.
0. MICHAEL BONAHOOM
Marquette LL.B., 1954
Indemnity-The Right of the United States Government to
Recover Indemnity From Its Negligent Employee*-In an action
against the United States for injuries arising when plaintiff's auto-
mobile collided with a government vehicle, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of California, Central Division, gave
judgment against the United States and in favor of the plaintiff, but
gave judgment over in favor of the United States against the driver
of the government vehicle, who had been impleaded as a party defend-
ant. On appeal by the employee to the court of appeals, Held: That
after suffering judgment against it under the Federal Tort Claims Act,"
the government could not recover, by way of indemnity, the amount
of such judgment from its employee, who was guilty of the negligence
which caused the injuries. Gilman v. United States, 206 F. 2nd 846
(9th Cir. 1953).
Thus the United States as an employer was not allowed to recoup
its losses from its negligent employee for damages caused while acting
within the scope of his employment. This holding is in direct conflict
with the universally accepted common" law doctrine2 which was ably
summarized by an early Wisconsin decision:
"As between the master and a stranger, the servant repre-
sents the master, and the master is responsible; but as between
the master and the servant who has committed the wrong or
violated his duty no less to the master than to the stranger, no
such rule prevails. A servant is directly liable to his master
for any damage occasioned by his negligence or misconduct,
whether such damage be direct to the property of the master,
or arise from compensation which the master has been obliged
to make to third persons for injuries sustained by them."'3
Were the United States Government not the employer seeking
recoupment, even the majority justices in the Gilman case would con-
*The principal case was affirmed in United States v. Gilman, 74 S.Ct. 695
(May 17, 1954).
'28 U.S.C.A. §1346 (b) (1948).
2For a discussion of the common law see especially: PRossFR, ToRTs at 1114
(1941); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY W401 comment c (1933); MECHEM, AGENCY
§532 (4th ed. 1952); Note, 110 A.L.R. 831 (1937).3 Zulkee v. Wing, 20 Wis. 408, 91 Am. Dec. 425 (1866).
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cede that the common law rule would apply.' But according to the
majority, ". . . regardless of whether state or federal law be here
applied, section 2676- cuts the ground from under the government's
olaim for indemnity," and thus places the government in a class by
itself, in whose favor "no cause of action ever arose."6
The power of section 26767 to protect the negligent employee is
difficult to rationalize, as this provision is nothing more than a
codification of the existing law of res ajudicata--whereby a litigant
is entitled to only one day in court on a given cause of action and to
only one satisfaction for his injured rights.
Yet the holding of the Gilman case comes as no great surprise.
As far back as 1941, although not speaking with specific reference
to the Tort Claims Act, the Attorney General expressed his view
that the Secretary of Agriculture was without authority to require an
employee to reimburse the government for a payment made in settle-
ment of a claim for property damage resulting from the employee's
negligence. In the opinion, it was pointed out that although Congress
had by general legislation progressively assumed liability to persons
sustaining injuries through the negligence of officers and employees
of the government, no provision had been made for the assertion of
claims by the government against the officers or employees causing
the damages. Secondly, that ". . . in the absence of statutory authority,
express or implied, an officer or employee of the government may not
be administratively deprived of his lawful compensation."
In July, 1948, an attorney in the Department of Justice wrote:
"It should be pointed out that in one of the early and well
established fields where indemnity has been historically opera-
tive, that is, in the master-servant relationship, the Federal Tort
Claims Act in its legislative history contemplates no action by
4
"The rule is one generally recognized and enforced by both state and fed-
eral courts." See principal case: Gilman v. United States, 206 F. 2nd 846(9th Cir. 1953).
528 U.S.C.A. §2676 (1948), enacted as part of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
provides:
"The judgment in an action under §1346 (b) of this title shall constitute
a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject
matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave
rise to the claim."
6 Gilman v. United States, supra, note 4.
7Supra, note .5.
sA prior judgment against the master is a bar to subsequent action on the
same subject matter against the servant, and vice versa, where the relation-
ship is. undisputed and the action is purely derivative and dependent entirely
upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, although there is neither privity
nor mutuality between the master and the servant.
See: Wolf v. Kenyon, 242 Sup. Ct., App. Div. 116, 273 N.Y.S. 170 (1934);
Jones v. Valisi, 111 Vt. 481, 18 A. 2nd 179 (1941); Silva v. Brown, 319 Mass.
466, 66 N.E. 2nd 349 (1946).
940 O.A.G. 38 (Mar. 25, 1941).
1954-55]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the United States against its delinquent employee, other than
disciplinary proceedings.""
Furthermore, the result arrived at in the Gilman case, although not
based on particularly sound reasoning, is not inconsistent with the
views of some modem writers as to the justification of the doctrine of
respondeat superior."' To them, the liability of the employer for the
negligent acts of the employee is a cost of doing business. This burden
the employer assumes but may distribute to the consumer in the form
of increased prices. Social expediency,- they say, requires that the cost
of these "inevitable" accidents be spread so that the injured party be
protected, as he for the most part is innocent of all blame. It is proper
that the employer should bear the immediate burden, as he is in the best
position both to distribute the cost of the loss upon the public, and to
discipline his employee so as to discourage him from such careless-
ness in the future. As to the latter issue, the effect of the employer's
pressure has even more influence than a suit against the employee
himself, because the perennial financial irresponsibility of the em-
ployee in effect puts him beyond the law of torts. In the words of one
author, ".... it is impossible to do anything in a law court to discourage
such wrongs directly.1
12
The whole idea of indemnity would defeat the basic purpose of
this doctrine. Indemnity seeks to localize the burden upon the wrong-
doer. The "entrepreneur theory"' 3 seeks an opposite result, somewhat
parallel in theory to workmen's compensation, whereby the cost is
distributed regardless of fault, so as to protect the injured party.14
This was apparently the underlying philosophy of the framers of
the Tort Claims Act which this court has adopted and carried to its
logical conclusion in the holding of the Gilman case. It is a modern
approach, inconsistent with the common law, but consistent with a
policy of protecting the individual and distributing the burden upon
the economy as a whole. Thus the common law gradually yields to
changing times and conditions. Whether the philosophy of this decision
will be extended further into the field of indemnity between master
and servant is a crucial question for the courts of the future to de-
cide. DON F. STARK
10 Irwin M. Gottlieb, "Some Aspects of Contribution and Indemnity in Tort
Actions against the United States." 9 FED. B. J. 391, 396 (1948).
11 MEcHEm AGENCY §359 (4th ed. 1952); Clarence Morris, The Torts of an
Independent Contractor," 29 ILL. L. REv. 339 (1934-5); Young B. Smith,
"Frolic and Detour," 23 COL. L. REv. 444 (1923).
12 Morris, "The Torts of an Independent Contractor," supra, note 11 at 341.
13 This aforementioned justification of the doctrine of respondeat superior has
been called the "'entrepreneur theory" by various legal writers. Supra, note 11.
4' "Surprising as it may seem, by the means of the doctrine of respondeat
superior, the common law has partially accomplished in the latter case what
workmen's compensation statutes have accomplished in the former." Smith,
"Frolic and Detour," supra, note 11 at 457.
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